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A BONE TO PICK WITH MEXICALI ROSE v. SUPERIOR
COURT: LIABILITY OF CALIFORNIA
RESTAURANTS FOR INJURIES CAUSED
BY SUBSTANCES IN FOOD
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a woman entering a quaint restaurant on the California
coastline. She decides to order the restaurant's specialty, chicken fricas-
see with dumplings. The dish is similar to stew, containing various fresh
vegetables, dumplings, and two large fillet breasts of chicken.1 As she
slices off a portion from the middle of a breast and bites into it, she sud-
denly feels a hard object stabbing her throat. She tries to cough, to drink
some water, but she cannot dislodge the object. Surgery reveals that this
object is a chicken bone, one half-inch long and one half-inch wide. Her
throat never completely heals, and she must live the remainder of her life
with constant discomfort in her throat.2
Had this scenario occurred prior to the 1950s, the restaurateur who
inflicted this lifelong suffering would have incurred no liability at all. At
that time, most states followed the California Supreme Court's decision
in Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co. ,' which established what is now referred to
as the "foreign-natural" test.' Under this test, plaintiffs could not re-
cover, as a matter of law, for injuries they received from "natural" ob-
jects in their food.5 For a consumer to recover in either tort or warranty,
1. IRMA S. ROMBAUER & MARION R. BACKER, THE JOY OF COOKING 426 (1985).
2. This hypothetical is based on Jim Dandy Fast Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter, 535 S.W.2d
786 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
3. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992). Courts in Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, New York, and North Carolina have all denied recovery to plaintiffs under the foreign-
natural test for injuries caused by natural objects. See Rosenberg v. Wachter, 138 A. 273 (Del.
1925) (chicken bone in chicken noodle soup); Davison-Paxon Co. v. Archer, 85 S.E.2d 182
(Ga. Ct. App. 1954) (holding defendant liable but noting that defendant would not have been
liable if injury-causing object in creamed turkey was identified as turkey bone); Goodwin v.
Country Club, 54 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1944) (chicken bone in creamed chicken); Brown
v. Nebiker, 296 N.W. 366 (Iowa 1941) (bone in pork chop); Courter v. Dilbert Bros., 186
N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (prune pit in prune butter); Adams v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 112 S.E.2d 92 (N.C. 1960) (corn grain in corn flakes), overruled by Goodman v.
Wenco Foods, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 444, 450 (N.C. 1992).
4. Mix, 6 Cal. 2d at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
5. Id.; see Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 4th 617, 622, 822 P.2d 1292, 1296, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 149 (1992).
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the object that injured him or her must have been "foreign" to the food,
such as a piece of glass.6
In 1993, however, the foreign-natural test is no longer the rule in
many jurisdictions because most states that have considered the issue of
objects in food have decided to abandon it in favor of the "reasonable
expectation" test.7 Under this test, liability is based not on whether the
injury-producing object was foreign or natural, but instead on whether
the consumer reasonably could have anticipated that object in the food.'
Moreover, unlike the determination of whether an object is foreign or
natural in the Mix test, the reasonableness of a consumer's expectations
is a jury question. 9 Therefore, it is far more likely that our hypothetical
plaintiff would recover for her injuries under the reasonable expectation
test than under the foreign-natural test.10
Unfortunately, however, she was injured in California, one of the
few states that does not follow the reasonable expectation test.11
Although the California Supreme Court claimed to be adopting the rea-
sonable expectation test in its recent decision Mexicali Rose v. Superior
Court, 2 in reality, the court did no such thing. Rather, it ruled that a
plaintiff injured by aforeign substance in food could sue the restaurateur
for negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, or
6. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 619, 822 P.2d at 1293-94, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146-47.
The foreign-natural test is discussed in detail infra part III.A.1.
7. See Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (I1. App. Ct. 1991), aff'd,
589 N.E.2d 547 (111. 1992); Stacy L. Mojica, Note, Breach of Implied Warranty: Has the
Foreign/Natural Test Lost Its Bite?, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 377 (1990). Ms. Mojica noted
that:
Currently, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have reported cases
dealing with the issue of deleterious objects that can be classified in at least some
sense as "natural" to the food consumed. Of those, twelve states and the District of
Columbia have explicitly recognized the reasonable expectations test; three states
have decided cases in a manner consistent with the test without clearly stating the
reasons for the decisions; and three states have applied or referenced the test at some
point but have applied the foreign/natural test in subsequent decisions.
Id. at 394.
8. See Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 619, 822 P.2d at 1294, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
9. Id. at 631, 822 P.2d at 1302, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
10. A jury would be unlikely to conclude that a reasonable person expects to find a half-
inch long bone in the middle of a chicken breast fillet because, by definition, fillets generally
contain no bones. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 850 (3d ed. 1976).
The jury in Jim Dandy Fast Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter, 535 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976),
the case upon which this hypothetical is based, agreed. Id. at 789. Application of the reason-
able expectation test is discussed in detail infra part III.A.3.
11. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 641, 822 P.2d at 1308-09, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-62
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
12. 1 Cal. 4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
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strict liability, but a plaintiff injured by a natural substance may only
state a cause of action in negligence.
13
This confusing ruling has two principle effects. First, it denies a
plaintiff injured by a natural object in his or her food the opportunity to
recover under implied warranty or strict liability principles. The court's
rationale was that such natural objects should always be expected, and
thus the food cannot be deemed unfit or defective.14 Second, in predicat-
ing a plaintiff's recovery on the type of object which injured him or her,
the court effectively rejected the reasonable expectation test it claimed to
adopt,15 and perpetuated the antiquated foreign-natural distinction it es-
tablished fifty-seven years ago in Mix. By combining the foreign-natural
test with the reasonable expectation test, the California Supreme Court
created a hybrid test that is "bizarre," "irrational," and "unfair."
1 6
This Note briefly discusses the Mexicali Rose decision and the
court's analysis.' 7 It then examines the tort theories of products liabil-
ity-negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty-and ar-
gues that plaintiffs injured by food served in a commercial restaurant
should be allowed to recover under all three theories regardless of
whether the object that injured them was "foreign" or "natural."1 8
Next, this Note analyzes California's continued adherence, through its
strange hybrid test, to the foreign-natural distinction in food cases, con-
cluding that California's refusal to follow a pure reasonable expectation
test defies statutes, case law, and common sense.' 9 Finally, this Note
urges the California Supreme Court to reconsider the issue of restaurant
owners'20 liability for natural injury-causing objects in food and reject its
confusing hybrid test in favor of a pure version of the reasonable expecta-
tion test.2 '
13. Id. at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303-04, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
14. Id. Plaintiffs' inability to recover under implied warranty and strict liability is dis-
cussed infra parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
15. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 646-47, 822 P.2d at 1312-13, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165-66
(Arabian, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 635, 822 P.2d at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
17. See infra part II.A.
18. See infra part II.B.
19. See infra part III.
20. The court limited its decision in Mexicali Rose to commercial restaurants, excluding
food manufacturers and wholesalers; the focus of this Note is the same. See Mexicali Rose, 1
Cal. 4th at 619 n.1, 822 P.2d at 1293 n.1, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146 n.1.
21. See infra part III.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court
Defendant Mexicali Rose owned and operated a Mexican restau-
rant.22 Plaintiff Jack A. Clark entered this restaurant and ordered a
chicken enchilada.2 3 As he ate the enchilada, a one-inch chicken bone
lodged in his throat, causing serious injuries.24 Mr. Clark brought suit
against defendant for damages based on theories of negligence, breach of
implied warranty, and strict liability.2" He alleged that defendant had
negligently left the bone in the food, thereby rendering the food defective
and unfit for consumption.26 Mr. Clark claimed that he did not expect to
find the bone and that it is not common knowledge that there may be
bones in chicken enchiladas. 27 He also sought punitive damages based
on his allegation that defendant initially refused to obtain medical assist-
ance for him.28
Defendant filed a demurrer which was denied by the trial court.29
The courf of appeal, however, issued a writ of mandate which directed
the trial court to sustain the demurrer as to all of Mr. Clark's causes of
action.30 The court of appeal reasoned that it was compelled by princi-
ples of stare decisis to follow the rule set forth in Mix over fifty years
earlier.3" Mr. Clark appealed the issuance of the writ of mandate and the
California Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
3 2
In its review of the case, the California Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff injured by a natural object in food could recover only under a
negligence theory, with no cause of action in either implied warranty or
strict liability.33 Only if the injury resulted from a foreign object could a
plaintiff sue under implied warranty or strict liability.
34
22. Mexcali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 620, 822 P.2d at 1294, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id These three theories of products liability are explained infra part II.B.





31. Id. As discussed above, the Mix rule insulates the restaurateur from any liability for
injuries caused by natural substances in food-including the chicken bone which injured
Clark. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
32. See Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1520, 782 P.2d 1139, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 683 (1989), depublished and rev'd, Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 4th 617, 822
P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
33. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
34. Id.
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The court began its analysis by reviewing the Mix v. Ingersoll Candy
Co. 35 decision and subsequent cases which followed Mix's foreign-natu-
ral rule.36 The court acknowledged that, in more recent years, many ju-
risdictions have abandoned this rule, applying instead the reasonable
expectation test.37 Although it appeared that the court would follow this
growing trend and adopt the reasonable expectation test, it took a strange
detour: The court noted that "many" courts have not adopted a pure
form of the reasonable expectation test, but rather have retained the for-
eign-natural distinction in applying it, resulting in a hybrid test.38 Con-
trary to the court's assertion, however, "many" courts have not adopted
this hybrid test; the test is virtually unsupported.39 Under the hybrid
test, a plaintiff injured by a natural object is allowed to recover only if he
or she can prove that the restaurant was negligent in its preparation of
the food.4' The plaintiff has no cause of action in strict liability or im-
plied warranty, however, because natural objects are to be expected and
therefore do not render the food "defective" or "unmerchantable" as de-
fined by the strict liability and implied warranty theories.41
B. The Three Theories of Products Liability
Before analyzing the various tests currently applied in restaurant lia-
bility cases, it is essential to examine some of the significant features of
each theory of products liability. The doctrine of products liability is
designed to protect purchasers, users, and bystanders injured by defective
products.42 There are three general theories of products liability43 avail-
35. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
36. Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 621-23, 822 P.2d at 1294-96, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147-49.
37. Id. at 625-26, 822 P.2d at 1297-98, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150-51.
38. Id. at 626, 822 P.2d at 1298, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151. The court, in its insistence that it
was adopting the reasonable expectation test, did not refer to its rule as a "hybrid." The rule
that it actually adopted, however, turns on whether the injury-causing object was foreign or
natural. Id. at 633-34, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. Only if the object is found to
be natural is the reasonable expectation test applied. Id. The Mexicali Rose rule, then, adopts
neither the foreign-natural test nor the reasonable expectation test. Rather, it fashions its own
test by combining the two standards. The details of this "hybrid" test are discussed infra part
III.A.2.
39. See infra part II.A.2.
40. See infra part III.A.2.
41. See infra part III.A.2.
42. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 95,
at 677 (5th ed. 1984).
43. Some commentators and courts recognize a fourth theory: negligence liability in con-
tract for breach of a warranty that the product was designed and constructed in a workmanlike
manner. Id. at 678; see also E.F. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing
Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 838 (1967) (noting this common-law theory is not
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able to plaintiffs: (1) negligence; (2) breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability; and (3) strict liability. The significant differences
among these three theories can greatly affect a plaintiff's ability to re-
cover. Moreover, these differences are especially relevant as a result of
the foreign-natural distinction in the Mexicali Rose hybrid rule.
1. Negligence
All jurisdictions accept the negligence standard as one of the theo-
ries of products liability.i4 Generally, the negligence standard consists of
four prongs.45 First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a
duty to act.46 Assuming that the defendant had a duty to act, he or she is
usually required to act as a reasonably prudent person under similar cir-
cumstances. 7 Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
breached his or her duty. 8 Third, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant's breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury."9
Finally, the plaintiff must prove and quantify the resulting damages.5" In
the products liability context, this theory results in a seller being held
liable for the negligence of a manufacturer whose product may reason-
ably be expected to inflict substantial harm if defective.5 '
In some respects, negligence can be the most effective theory of re-
covery for a plaintiff in a products liability action. The amount of dam-
ages recoverable, for example, may be significantly greater in a
negligence suit than in an implied warranty suit" because negligence not
only allows recovery of all reasonably foreseeable damages,"3 but also
may permit recovery of punitive damages.54 The amount of damages
available in a breach of warranty action, by contrast, is typically much
applicable to product suppliers under Uniform Commercial Code; it is limited to housing
merchants).
44. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
45. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 30, at 164-65; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 281 (1984) (listing elements of negligence cause of action).
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 30, at 164.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 30, at 165.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 96, at 682-83; see also Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 415, 126 P.2d 345, 347
(1942) (holding defendant liable for negligent construction of chair).
52. See Mojica, supra note 7, at 378 n.2.
53. See Lawrence A. Towers & Peter L. Gardon, Circumvention of Article 2: Tort Reme-
dies for Breach of Contract, 19 UCC L.J. 291, 292-93 (1987).
54. See Mojica, supra note 7, at 378 n.2.
[Vol. 27:397
MEXICALI ROSE v. SUPERIOR COURT
more limited."5 Moreover, while a seller or manufacturer may disclaim
the implied warranty,56 there is no such option under negligence or strict
liability. Nonetheless, significant disadvantages to the plaintiff exist
under the negligence standard, especially in comparison to the other two
theories of products liability. 7
2. Strict liability
The principles underlying the theory of strict liability are extremely
different than those underlying the theory of negligence. Most signifi-
cantly, negligence requires the plaintiff to show the defendant's lack of
due care,5" but strict liability requires no showing of fault. 9 Under strict
liability, even if the defendant exercised all possible care in producing
and marketing a product, he or she is liable for any defect that injures the
plaintiff."
Strict products liability originated in the food arena.61 Fueled by
many public policy concerns, the theory gained popularity and spread
quickly to other products. 2 This popularity ultimately led to the formu-
lation, in 1964, of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.6 3
55. See id.
56. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 97, at 691.
57. See infra part III.B.
58. See supra part II.B.1.
59. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 98, at 692-93.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 97, at 690; see also Prosser, supra note 44, at 1106-07 (discussing history of strict
liability).
62. Prosser, supra note 44, at 1111-12. Dean Prosser wrote this article in 1960, when strict
liability was just beginning to gain popularity. He commented:
The wall is still stoutly defended; and most of the courts which accept strict liability
without privity as to food still refuse to apply it to [other products] .... Of late,
however, there has been here and there a breach; the assault goes on apace, and as
the nineteen sixties are upon us, it becomes evident that we are to witness a new
onslaught ... the first cracks in the wall were small, and apparently insignificant,
when the analogy of food was carried over to something reasonably resembling it
The last two years have brought no less than seven spectacular decisions, which
appear to have thrown the limitation to food onto the ash pile, and to hold that the
seller of any product who sells it in a condition dangerous for use is strictly liable
Id. at 1110-12.
63. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 98, at 693. Section 402A revolutionized products
liability law and is generally recognized as the framework for strict products liability in juris-
dictions throughout the country. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 28.15, at 445 (2d ed. 1986) (recognizing revolutionary effect of section 402A and its adoption
by many jurisdictions). Section 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
November 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Section 402A contains four requirements. To prevail under section
402A, the plaintiff must show: (1) The defendant is in the business of
selling products expected to reach the consumer without substantial
change; (2) the product was in defective condition; (3) the product was
unreasonably dangerous; and (4) the defect resulted in physical harm."
Once these four requirements are met, the defendant is liable regardless
of whether he or she took care to prevent the injury.
Surprisingly, although section 402A imposes liability on a defendant
without any showing of fault, the California cases which have considered
section 402A have found it too restrictive.6" The California courts have
disagreed with the limitation placed on the plaintiff's recovery by the
second and third prongs of section 402A. Under section 402A's stan-
dard, not every defect which causes injury warrants the imposition of
strict liability; rather, the plaintiff recovers only when the product is both
"defective" and "unreasonably dangerous."" The California courts de-
cided that requiring a plaintiff to prove both of these prongs was too
great a burden,67 reasoning that the terms "defective" and "unreasonably
dangerous" are often synonymous. In effect, the courts held that a defec-
tive product necessarily does not meet the expectations of the reasonable
consumer; thus, by virtue of its defect, the product is also unreasonably
dangerous. Only when the public holds a particular product in low es-
teem are the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" not synon-
ymous. In this situation, the reasonable consumer has lower
expectations; therefore, although the product is defective, it is not
necessarily unreasonably dangerous. The courts, however, wanted to
prevent defendants from escaping liability simply because the public
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relations with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1984).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
65. See 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 1243, at 679 (9th ed. 1988),
which comments that "[t]he terse language of Section 402A is amplified in extensive Com-
ments, and both the section and the Comments are constantly cited by the courts as authorita-
tive statements of the law.... On occasion, however, the California Supreme Court has gone
beyond the Restatement."
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. See 6 WrrKIN, supra note 65, § 1248, at 683.
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holds their products in low esteem.6" Thus, to protect the injured plain-
tiff from this possibility and to alleviate the plaintiff's burden of proving
that a product is both "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous," the
California Supreme Court eliminated the second prong of section
402A.69 Accordingly, a plaintiff in California must show only that the
product which injured him or her was unreasonably dangerous.
3. Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
Although the implied warranty of merchantability is generally codi-
fied under contract law,7 ° it originated in tort law; as a result, it has been
described as "a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract."7 The warranty is read into every contract for the sale of
goods, and requires that the goods sold be merchantable.72 The underly-
ing assumption is that the parties to the contract would have agreed to
such a requirement had they thought of it.73 It is similar to strict liability
68. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425, 573 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 233 (1978).
69. These alterations to section 402A were made by the California Supreme Court in two
recent cases: Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972), and Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225. Both cases made the
same substantive changes to section 402A; the difference between them is merely the type of
defect that they addressed.
Products liability doctrines cover three types of product defects: (1) a flaw in the product
that was present at the time it was sold, sometimes referred to as a construction defect; (2) a
failure of the manufacturer or seller of the product to warn the buyer or user of a hazard
related to the product's design; and (3) a defect in the design of the product which results in
every unit of that product being defective. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 99, at 695. A
defect in the duty to warn will only be an issue in cases concerning products in which the
manufacturer or seller knew or should have known that the product required some warning, as
with a prescription drug. Id. § 96, at 688. Hence, this defect is rarely, if ever, an issue in the
food arena.
In Cronin and Barker, the California Supreme Court discussed the other two types of
products defects. The plaintiff in Cronin was injured when a hasp, a device used to hold bread
trays in place in a bread truck, snapped during a collision, causing the trays to strike the
plaintiff in the back. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435. The
California Supreme Court held the defendant liable, eliminating the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement of section 402A. Id. at 135, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. Barker
followed Cronin and extended the rule to design defect cases. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573
P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233. Consequently, the court broadened the doctrine of strict
products liability in California. As discussed infra part III.B, however, the Mexicali Rose
decision ensures that a plaintiff injured by a natural object in food does not benefit from Cali-
fornia's more liberal products liability rules as developed in Cronin and Barker.
70. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 (1990).
71. Prosser, supra note 44, at 1126.
72. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
73. Mitchel J. Ezer, The Impact of the U.C C. on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8
UCLA L. REV. 281, 292 (1961).
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because a defendant who breaches the warranty is held liable despite tak-
ing the utmost care.74 The elements required to establish the warranty,
however, are based on contract law.
75
Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code presents a general
framework for the implied warranty of merchantability and has been
adopted verbatim by many states, including California. 76 Under this sec-
tion, three elements must be established for a plaintiff to recover: (1)
There must be a sale of goods (as opposed to the performance of a ser-
vice);77 (2) the seller must be a "merchant"; 78 and (3) the goods sold
must be "merchantable. ' 79 Once the plaintiff establishes these three ele-
74. HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 28.15, at 447-53.
75. Prosser, supra note 44, at 1126-27.
76. See CAL. COM. CODE § 2314 (West 1992). This section reads:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality with the descrip-
tion; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, qual-
ity and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Both the Uniform Commercial Code and the California Commercial Code define
"merchant" as follows:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attrib-
uted by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his
occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
CAL. COM. CODE § 2104(1) (West 1992); U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1990). The Official Comments
which follow this section further define "merchant" as it is used in § 2-314:
[I]n Section 2-314 on the warranty of merchantability, such warranty is implied only
"if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Obviously this quali-
fication restricts the implied warranty to a much smaller group than everyone who is
engaged in business and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods.
CAL. COM. CODE § 2104(1); U.C.C. § 2-104(1). The purpose of defining "merchant" in this
manner, therefore, seems to be to limit the Code's applicability to those who sell the particular
goods as a profession. That is, one who sells cars from a commercial dealership would be a
"merchant," while one who simply sells a used car in a private transaction would not.
79. CAL. COM. CODE § 2314.
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ments, the defendant is held liable despite taking the utmost care to avoid
causing an injury."s
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Development of Three Tests to Determine Restaurateurs'
Liability
Until 1973, courts had developed two tests to determine whether
food was defective or unmerchantable: the foreign-natural test and the
80. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 28.15, at 447-53.
Two other elements of the implied warranty inquiry should be mentioned here to clarify
the approach of this Note.
As explained above, when all of the elements of the implied warranty are met, it operates
much like the strict liability standard. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Despite this
similarity, however, there are two elements of the implied warranty theory which differentiate
it from strict liability in tort. Both of these elements, however, have been rendered irrelevant
in the context of restaurateur liability. Thus, this Note will examine strict liability and war-
ranty together because they operate almost identically in the vast majority of restaurant cases.
The first element that normally differentiates the implied warranty from strict liability is
the requirement that the defendant and plaintiff be in privity with each other. See KEETON ET
AL., supra note 42, § 96, at 681. "Privity" is defined as the "[d]erivative interest founded on,
or growing out of, contract, connection or bond of union between parties." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). Originally privity was construed very strictly and barred
the plaintiff's suit unless he or she had directly purchased the product from the defendant. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 96, at 681. Recently, however, the privity requirement has
been relaxed, allowing more and more plaintiffs to sue manufacturers. Id. In food and drug
liability cases in California, the privity requirement has been eliminated completely. See 3
WITKIN, supra note 65, § 106, at 89 (9th ed. 1987) (commenting that privity requirement was
eliminated in food and drug arenas mainly because it is common for buyers of these products
to buy them for family or guests and that because sellers of food or drug are aware of this fact,
it would be unfair to allow them to escape liability simply for lack of technical requirement of
privity).
The second factor which differentiates the implied warranty from strict liability is the fact
that the defendant seller may, in some instances, disclaim the warranty. See REED DICKER-
SON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER § 2.2, at 97-98 n.10 (1951). Such a
disclaimer would allow the seller to escape liability, which is impossible under strict liability.
Id. Again, however, in the food context the issue of disclaimers is virtually irrelevant, for two
primary reasons. First, such disclaimers are rarely made. Id. Second, both the Uniform
Commercial Code and the California Commercial Code set high standards for the viability of
such disclaimers, requiring inter alia that they mention "merchantability" and be conspicuous
if in writing. See CAL. COM. CODE § 2316 (West 1992); U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990). These strict
requirements make it unlikely that a disclaimer will be applicable in the restaurant context.
Although these two elements of the implied warranty theory may serve to differentiate it
from strict liability in other contexts, they are of little, if any, significance in the area of restau-
rateur liability: The two theories will almost always operate identically in a plaintiff's suit
against a restaurant. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968),
which held that, under California law, there was "no error in the District Court's choice to
present this case to the jury on warranty rather than on strict liability in tort. The law as
emerging is tending toward the latter treatment but under either approach the elements remain
the same. The difference is largely one of terminology."
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reasonable expectation test.81 In 1973, however, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal in Loyacano v. Continental Insurance Co. 2 blended these ap-
proaches, creating a third, "hybrid" test.13 Nonetheless, until the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided the Mexicali Rose case, most states simply
applied either the original foreign-natural test8" or the reasonable expec-
tation test; 5 Louisiana was the only state to apply the hybrid rule which
combines the two tests.8 6 Now, however, as a result of the California
Supreme Court's decision in Mexicali Rose, California has become the
second state to apply the hybrid test.
8 7
This hybrid test was an attempt by the California Supreme Court to
remedy the shortcomings of the original Mix foreign-natural test.88 The
court realized that the Mix rule was too restrictive on injured plaintiffs.8 9
Yet while it wanted to broaden a plaintiff's ability to recover, the court
also sought to avoid shifting the entire burden of liability to defendant
restaurants.90 The court apparently believed the hybrid test would be an
effective way to achieve a balance between these two competing interests.
Notwithstanding the court's good intentions, however, the Mexicali Rose
decision does not achieve its objective: The reasonable expectation test-
not the foreign-natural or hybrid tests-is the best way to fairly balance
the competing interests at stake in restaurant liability cases.
81. See DICKERSON, supra note 80, §§ 4.1-4.3, at 183-90.
82. 283 So. 2d 302 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
83. Id. at 305-06. Although the hybrid test was not referred to by the Loyacano court as a
third test, it does vary from both the foreign-natural or reasonable expectation tests, and thus
is treated in this Note as a separate test.
84. See, eg., Norris v. Pig 'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 53 S.E.2d 718 (Ga. Ct. App.
1949); Brown v. Nebiker, 296 N.W. 366 (Iowa 1941); Adams v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co.,
112 S.E.2d 92 (N.C. 1960), overruled by Goodman v. Wenco Foods, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 444, 450
(N.C. 1992).
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. C.F.M., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Kan. 1989); Hong v. Marriott
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445 (D. Md. 1987); Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061
(S.D. Tex. 1974); Carl v. Dixie Co., 467 So. 2d 960 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Hochberg v.
O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1971); Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc.,
201 So. 2d 824 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Phillips v. Town of West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d
1331 (Mass. 1989); Stark v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); Thompson v. Law-
son Milk Co., 356 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976); Williams v. Braum Ice Cream Stores,
Inc., 534 P.2d 700 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Jeffries v. Clark's Restaurant Enters., 580 P.2d 1103
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. 1960).
86. See Title v. Pontchartrain Hotel, 449 So. 2d 677 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Loyacano v.
Continental Ins. Co., 283 So. 2d 302 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,
178 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
87. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
88. See id. at 629-31, 822 P.2d at 1300-02, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153-55.
89. See id. at 629, 822 P.2d at 1300, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153.
90. See id at 630-31, 822 P.2d at 1301-02, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-55.
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1. The foreign-natural test
The foreign-natural test, developed by the California Supreme Court
in Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co. ,91 looks to the origin of the injury-causing
object to determine whether the food containing the object is defective or
unmerchantable. 92 In Mix, the plaintiff was injured when he swallowed
a piece of chicken bone while eating a chicken pot pie in defendant's
restaurant.93 The court denied him recovery, holding that, as a matter of
law, the chicken pie was not unfit for consumption.94 The court's ration-
ale was that a consumer cannot expect to be served a perfect meal, but
rather, one "reasonably fit" for consumption.95 This belief, coupled with
the court's finding that it is common knowledge that chicken pot pies
occasionally contain chicken bones, led the court to conclude that con-
sumers should expect to occasionally find natural objects in their food.96
Under the Mix rule, then, the only way for the plaintiff to recover under
any theory is to show that a foreign substance caused the injury.97
After Mix, courts in several states adopted the foreign-natural test.98
The support initially enjoyed by the foreign-natural test, however, has
waned in recent years. Even in Mix, the California Supreme Court
stated in dicta that its holding was based partly on its consideration of a
consumer's expectations when buying food.99 Thus, although Mix estab-
lished the foreign-natural test, it actually used the language of the
91. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
92. Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
93. Id. at 676, 59 P.2d at 145.
94. Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148.
95. Ia
96. See id. at 682-83, 59 P.2d at 148.
97. See id. In Mix, the court denied the plaintiff recovery under both negligence and
implied warranty. In analyzing the implied warranty claim, the court commented that "we are
of the opinion that despite the fact that a chicken bone may occasionally be encountered in a
chicken pie, such chicken pie, in the absence of some further defect, is reasonably fit for human
consumption." Id. at 682, 59 P.2d at 148. The court's comments in rejecting the plaintiff's
negligence claim, however, addressed the duty of care of the defendant:
[We believe it is] a question of whether or not a restaurant keeper in the exercise of
due care is required to serve in every instance a perfect chicken pie .... If the cus-
tomer has no right to expect such a perfect product, and we think he is not so enti-
tled, then it cannot be said that it was negligence on the part of the restaurant keeper
to fail to furnish an entirely boneless chicken pie.
Id. at 683, 59 P.2d at 148.
98. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
99. Mix, 6 Cal. 2d at 682, 59 P.2d at 148 ("Bones which are natural to the type of meat
served cannot legitimately be called a foreign substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes
ought to anticipate and be on his guard against the presence of such bones." (emphasis
added)).
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reasonable expectation test. Five years later, the Iowa Supreme Court
duplicated this reasoning in Brown v. Nebiker. "
In Brown, the court denied recovery to the estate of an individual
who died from injuries caused by a bone in a pork chop. 10 ' Basing its
decision on the foreign-natural distinction, 10 2 the court nonetheless men-
tioned that its holding was based in part on the fact that such bones are
to be expected. 0 3 Thus, dicta in both Mix and Brown indicate that even
at the inception of the foreign-natural test, the courts recognized that a
consumer's expectations should play a substantial role in determining the
defendant's liability.
Perhaps the courts' uneasiness with the foreign-natural distinction
stems from the fact that it has many inherent defects. For example, the
test-although seemingly simple to apply-actually provides courts with
little guidance in deciding cases. Once a court determines that it will
apply the foreign-natural test, the next inquiry is whether the object in
question is foreign or natural." This only leads to the further question
of how to define "foreign" and "natural." Often the answer is obvious,
as when a plaintiff eating a chicken enchilada is injured by a chicken
bone. There will be many instances, however, when it is not so simple to
determine whether the object is natural to the food.'05 Thus, although
the foreign-natural distinction initially appears to be a bright-line rule, in
reality it only shifts the controversy to an inquiry into what is foreign and
what is natural.
The majority opinion in Mexicali Rose attempted to remedy this
problem by adding a qualifier when it stated that "the term 'natural' re-
fers to bones and other substances natural to the product served, and
does not encompass substances such as mold, botulinous bacteria or
100. 296 N.W. 366 (Iowa 1941).
101. Id. at 371.
102. Id. The decedent was attending a sales representatives' meeting in the Blue Room of
the Iowana Hotel in Creston, Iowa. Id. at 367-68. He did not order the pork chop personally,
as the menu was prearranged by the organizer of the meeting. Id. The pork chop was served
breaded. Id.
103. Id. at 371 (stating that "[o]ne who eats pork chops.., or the type of meat that bones
are natural to, ought to anticipate and be on his guard against the presence of bones, which he
knows will be there").
104. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 645 n.1, 822 P.2d at 1311 n.1, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164
n.1 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
105. For example, as Justice Mosk notes in his dissenting opinion in Mexicali Rose, salmo-
nella and rat flesh are both natural substances, but surely their presence would render a food
product unfit for consumption. Id. at 635, 822 P.2d at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Or consider a seafood stew which contains various types of shellfish, but which
does not contain crab, when the plaintiffis injured by a crabshell. Is that shell to be considered
natural or foreign to the food?
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other substances (like rat flesh or cow eyes) not natural to the preparation
of the product served."' 6 This statement, however, clarified nothing be-
cause the court did not define what substances or categories of substances
are "natural to the preparation" of food. 107 Thus, the court's definition
of what is a natural object only complicates the work of the trial courts.
Now, rather than inquiring whether the object in question was foreign or
natural to the food, courts must ask whether the object was foreign or
"natural to the preparation" of the food. Courts will be at least as con-
fused as they were before Mexicali Rose.
This on-going confusion is illustrated by the recent case of Kilpa-
trick v. Superior Court,' 8 the only published opinion which has applied
the Mexicali Rose rule to date. In Kilpatrick, the plaintiff became se-
verely ill after eating raw oysters ordered from a hotel's room service.'0 9
His illness was later determined to have resulted from a bacterium in the
oysters, vibrio cholerae.110 According to the court, vibrio cholerae is a
bacterium inherent in all oysters: Oysters feed by filtering water through
themselves, resulting in a buildup of vibrio cholerae."'
The trial court decided the case prior to the Mexicali Rose decision.
It held that since the plaintiff ate the oysters raw-in their natural
state-he could not sue in either strict liability or implied warranty." 2
The appellate court heard the case after Mexicali Rose and reversed the
trial court's decision, holding explicitly that "[v]ibrio cholerae is a for-
eign substance to raw oysters."'1 3 The court, however, did not explain
how it reached that conclusion. Although it mentioned that Mexicali
Rose changed the standard from "natural" to "natural to the prepara-
tion" of the food, it found that this new definition provided no real
guidance. 114
This case, therefore, illustrates the problems created by the foreign-
natural rule-problems which the Mexicali Rose rule does nothing to
106. Id. at 630 n.5, 822 P.2d at 1304 n.5, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 n.5.
107. See id. at 645 n.1, 822 P.2d at 1311 n.l, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164 n.1 (Arabian, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the only thing that the Mexicali Rose explanation really clarifies is that
the substances it explicitly lists-mold, botulinous bacteria, rat flesh and cow eyes-are not to
be considered natural substances. Id. at 630 n.5, 822 P.2d at 1304 n.5, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157
n.5. This, however, is not much of a revelation.
108. 8 Cal. App. 4th 1717, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (1992).
109. Id. at 1719, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324.
110. Id. at 1720, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324.
111. Id. The bacteria continue to grow under refrigeration, but their growth is slowed if the
oysters are refrigerated at a proper temperature. Id.
112. Id. at 1725, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328.
113. Id., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 327.
114. Id.
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remedy. As they did in Kilpatrick, parties in future cases will litigate the
issue of whether the injury-producing substance is foreign or "natural to
the preparation" of the food. And, as in Kilpatrick, the lower courts will
be forced to guess blindly because the Mexicali Rose court offered no
guidance.'
1 5
The difficulty courts will face in determining whether an object is
foreign or natural leads to another, related problem: The foreign-natural
test results in inconsistent verdicts.1 16 The subjective nature of the for-
eign or natural inquiry can cause two courts to reach different verdicts
under similar sets of facts, simply because one of the courts characterized
the object as foreign and the other decided that it was natural. For ex-
ample, in Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp. ,"7 the plaintiff was eating Hot
Barquette of Seafood Mornay' 1 8 when a fish bone lodged in his throat.119
He sustained serious injuries and subsequently sued the hotel under an
implied warranty theory. The court denied him recovery, however, be-
cause it determined that the bone was a natural object. 120 In Lore v. De
Simone Bros. ,121 by contrast, the plaintiff was injured by a bone fragment
in a piece of salami.1 22 Finding this piece of bone to be a foreign object,
the court allowed the plaintiff to recover for her injuries. 123 The Lore
court distinguished the other "bone in food" cases by pointing out that
salami is a processed form of meat, and therefore a piece of bone is less
expected.1 24 This distinction is not very convincing, however, because
most food served in restaurants, including the Hot Barquette of Seafood
115. This definitional void left by the Mexicali Rose court will become especially important
in the near future, when the flood of litigation resulting from the Jack-in-the-Box/E. coil bacte-
ria cases enters the courts. The courts will have to decide whether E. col is foreign or "natural
to the preparation" of the food. On the one hand, the bacteria appear to be natural since they
regularly live in the digestive tract of warm-blooded animals, particularly cattle. Daniel P.
Puzo, How Much More Tainted Hamburger Meat?, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1993, at H29. On
the other hand, the courts may choose to analogize to Kilpatrick, since both E. coll and vibrio
cholerae are bacteria which live in their carriers. See id.; Kilpatrick, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 1720,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324. In any case, the underlying point is that these E. coli cases, and all
future tainted-food cases in California, will revolve around the issue of whether the substance
was foreign or "natural to the preparation" of the food.
116. See Mojica, supra note 7, at 398-99.
117. 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
118. Hot Barquette of Seafood Mornay is a combination of several fishes in a cream sauce.
Id. at 891.
119. Id at 892.
120. Id. at 893.
121. 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1958).
122. Id at 831.
123. Id
124. Id. Although this may sound like a reasonable expectation test analysis, the court
relied on cases which had applied the foreign-natural test in reaching its decision. Id.
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Mornay in Shapiro, is processed to some degree. 125 Since that justifica-
tion fails, one must conclude that the Lore court's underlying reasoning
was that the plaintiff did not expect such a large bone fragment in her
salami. Therefore, if the court truly had applied the foreign-natural test
without considering the plaintiff's expectations, it should have concluded
that the plaintiff could not recover. A bone in salami is perhaps one of
the clearest possible examples of a natural object in food. The court
turned the test on its head, however, finding the bone to be a foreign
object.1 26 This is similar to what occurred in the California Kilpatrick
decision. Although the court held vibrio cholerae to be a foreign sub-
stance, many people would likely disagree. Intuitively it seems that a
substance inherent in an animal by virtue of its eating habits is a "natu-
ral" substance. The fact that the Kilpatrick court concluded that it was
foreign demonstrates the malleability of the foreign-natural and Mexicali
Rose tests and the potential injustices which may result from them.
Besides leading to inconsistent verdicts, the issue of food processing
in Shapiro and Lore leads to another problem inherent in the foreign-
natural test. By inquiring whether the injury-causing object was foreign
or natural, the test focuses on the origin of the object rather than on the
condition of the food as served.127 This focus might be appropriate if the
food were served in the same condition in which the restaurant received
it-generally, raw and unprocessed-but more often than not this is not
the case. 128 Thus, to look at whether the injury-causing object was for-
eign or natural is to ignore all of the various processes which the food
undergoes before it is served.
Because the likelihood of an injurious object in food is reduced by
the amount of processing that food undergoes, focusing on the object's
origin is improper.12 9 For example, the likelihood of finding bones in a
chicken wing is obviously greater than finding them in a chicken fillet. It
is unreasonable to ignore this significant difference when deciding
whether plaintiffs injured in these situations can recover. The foreign-
natural test, however, refuses to take this factor into account, denying
recovery to plaintiffs in both situations because the bone is a natural ob-
125. Shapiro, 132 F. Supp. at 892.
126. Lore, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
127. See Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So. 2d 975, 978 (Ala.
1983); O'Dell v. DeJean's Packing Co., 585 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978); Betehia v.
Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 67-69 (Wis. 1960).
128. See Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. 1971).
129. See id.
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ject. 3 ° The only chance for a plaintiff injured by such a natural object
under the foreign-natural test, therefore, is to garner the sympathy of the
court as the plaintiffs in Lore and Kilpatrick apparently did.
2. The Mexicali Rose hybrid test
At first, it appears that the Mexicali Rose court recognized at least
some of the flaws of the foreign-natural test 131 because it explicitly re-
jected the test in its opinion. Upon closer inspection, however, it is obvi-
ous that the test which the court adopted is more an affirmation than a
rejection of the foreign-natural test. This test is not, as the court as-
serted, the reasonable expectation test, but rather is a strange hybrid test
which, in practice, is very similar to the original foreign-natural test cre-
ated in Mix.
This Mexicali Rose formulation is not so much a new test as it is a
combination of the other two.132 It consists of a two-step inquiry.
133
First, the court determines whether the injury-producing substance is
foreign or natural to the food. If the harmful substance is foreign, the
defendant is held strictly liable and no further analysis is required.' 34 In
this respect this test is no different from the original Mix foreign-natural
rule. 135 If, however, the substance is found to be natural to the food, the
analysis proceeds to the second step. It is at this second step that the
hybrid rule varies slightly from the Mix analysis. If the substance is nat-
ural to the food, this test allows the plaintiff to bring a negligence cause
of action rather than barring his or her recovery completely as the Mix
rule did. 136
Although this test only slightly modifies the original foreign-natural
rule, the Mexicali Rose court apparently believed that it was adopting the
reasonable expectation test when it stated this two-part rule. 137 The
court commented: "[W]e agree with plaintiff that a 'reasonable expecta-
tion' test is applicable in this context and, in part at least, is consistent
130. See id.; see also Zabner v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 201 So. 2d 824, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967) (commenting that court's inquiry must be into "what the consumer might reason-
ably expect to find in the food as served and not what might be natural to the ingredients...
prior to preparation").
131. See supra part III.A.1.
132. Indeed, this third variation has never been formally recognized in any opinion as a
third test. Because it does vary from both the original foreign-natural test formulated in Mix
and the reasonable expectation test, however, it is treated here as a separate test.
133. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 630-31, 822 P.2d at 1301-02, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-55.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 626, 822 P.2d at 1298, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
136. Id. at 630-31, 822 P.2d at 1301-02, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-55.
137. Id. at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303-04, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
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with the development of tort law in our jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
adopt that test as our own." 138
Contrary to this statement, however, the court perpetuated the for-
eign-natural distinction by making the first inquiry in the hybrid test
whether the object is foreign or natural. 13 9 As a result, the hybrid rule is
destined to suffer from all of the shortcomings that plague the foreign-
natural distinction. Moreover, the Mexicali Rose hybrid test will be even
more problematic than the original foreign-natural test because it also
suffers from flaws of its own.
The first of these flaws is a practical one. The hybrid test is an
anomaly, virtually unsupported by case law. The court did not provide a
sound basis for its decision; there was little support or analysis offered
and the court seemed to adopt this test out of thin air.1" First, the court
claimed that "[m]any cases" in "several courts" have adopted this hybrid
rule. 41 However, these "many cases" are actually only three, and the
"several courts" are all in Louisiana. 42 Nevertheless, the court relied
heavily on these three cases, and ultimately adopted the rule that they
created. 43 The first of these cases is Musso v. Picadilly Cafeterias, Inc. 144
In Musso, the court followed the original foreign-natural test and explic-
itly rejected the reasonable expectation test; nonetheless, it allowed plain-
tiffs to pursue negligence claims if they had been injured by natural
objects.1 45 The practical effect of the Musso holding, then, is no different
than the rule of Mexicali Rose because the tests which both courts
adopted are based on the distinction between foreign and natural objects
and not on a consumer's reasonable expectations.
The second Louisiana case was Loyacano v. Continental Insurance
Co. 146 In Loyacano, the court took Musso one step further and created
the test which the Mexicali Rose court adopted: The court first deter-
mined whether the object was foreign or natural, and then applied the
138. Id. at 621, 822 P.2d at 1294, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
139. Id. at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303-04, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
140. Id. at 639, 822 P.2d at 1307, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (commenting
that "[w]ithout any particular effort at analysis, the court has put its approval on [the hybrid
test] for injuries caused by food").
141. Id. at 626, 822 P.2d at 1298, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 ("Many cases adopting a 'reason-
able expectation' test, however, did not reject completely the foreign-natural test when the
injury was caused by a substance natural to the food served. Rather, several courts have re-
tained the foreign-natural distinction in applying the 'reasonable expectation' test.").
142. See id. at 639-40, 822 P.2d at 1307-08, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-61 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
144. 178 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
145. Id. at 427.
146. 283 So. 2d 302 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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reasonable expectation test only if the object was natural. 47 Similarly,
the third Louisiana case, Title v. Pontchartrain Hotel,148 simply adopted
the reasoning of Musso and Loyacano.149 Despite its analysis of these
cases, the Mexicali Rose court did not explain why it was willing to be-
come the first court outside of Louisiana to adopt this rule. In fact, the
only comment that it offered for its adoption of the hybrid test was that it
was "the trend developing in courts recently."'5 0 There is, however, no
trend outside of California or Louisiana that supports the hybrid test. 5 '
The second major flaw of the hybrid test is that it is based on a
faulty presumption: All natural objects are to be expected and therefore
do not render the food unfit for consumption as a matter of law. 152 Be-
cause the food is not unfit, the court reasoned, plaintiffs injured by natu-
ral objects can only sue under a negligence theory. 5 3 This is not a
reasonable conclusion.
When food contains an object, whether foreign or natural, the ques-
tion of whether that food has been rendered unfit for consumption should
not be decided as a matter of law. There are simply too many factual
considerations, such as the size of the object, the type of food it was in,
and the conditions in the kitchen, that must be resolved. These are prop-
erly considerations for a jury, not a judge.I54 Yet, by deciding as a mat-
147. Id. at 305-06.
148. 449 So. 2d 677 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
149. Id. at 680.
150. Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 630, 822 P.2d at 1301, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
151. In fact, only two other cases outside of Louisiana have even cited to Musso, Loyacano,
or Title. See id. at 640, 822 P.2d at 1308, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The
first of these was Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1974), which
only cited to Loyacano as "an example of the confusion which adherence to the foreign-natural
distinction can create." Id. at 1065-66. The second case was Evart v. Suli, 211 Cal. App. 3d
605, 259 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1989), a California case. In Evart, however, the court made no sug-
gestion that the plaintiff injured by a natural object should be limited to proving negligence.
Id.
In addition, the court singled out one other case which it heavily relied on, Ex pare
Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1983). This case, however,
neither cites the line of Louisiana cases, nor applies the two-step hybrid test. See id. at 978-79.
Rather, Morrison's Cafeteria is simply a case which applies the reasonable expectation test.
See id.
152. Hence the test bars plaintiffs injured by these natural objects from recovering under
strict liability or implied warranty. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. A discus-
sion of strict liability and implied warranty as viable and, indeed, necessary theories of recov-
ery for those plaintiffs appears infra part III.B.
153. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303-04, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
154. See id.; see also, e.g, Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846, 849
(D.C. 1971) ("We think the question of what appellant was reasonably justified in expecting
was properly a jury question here."); Jim Dandy Fast Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter, 535 S.W.2d
786, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ("Reasonable persons might also differ as to whether the piece
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ter of law that a plaintiff injured by a natural object can only sue in
negligence, the Mexicali Rose court took these issues from the jury. In
effect, the court has decided that because the object was natural, the dish
was fit for consumption.155
It is far too simplistic, however, to equate natural objects with fit
food. 5 6 A natural object can have just as much, or perhaps more, delete-
rious effect on food and the person who eats it as a foreign object does.
For example, sand is a foreign item in spinach, but because it is com-
monly found there, it is doubtful that many people would consider the
spinach to be defective or unmerchantable. On the other hand, a cow's
eye or a chicken's beak are natural to beef and chicken respectively, but
most people would probably agree that these items render the food unfit
for consumption. 5 7 Although the reasonable expectation test recognizes
these facts, the Mexicali Rose hybrid test fails to consider this disparity
due to its blind application of the foreign-natural distinction.
3. The reasonable expectation test
The reasonable expectation test is empirically more flexible than the
foreign-natural and hybrid tests. It does not rely solely on the nature of
the injury-causing object in determining the defendant's liability, but
rather asks whether a reasonable person could have anticipated the ob-
ject encountered in the food."5 8 Thus, unlike the other two tests, the
reasonable expectation test allows courts to engage in case-by-case evalu-
ations of liability rather than forcing them to apply an inflexible, absolute
rule. The reasonable expectation test evolved gradually, as courts strug-
gled to avoid harsh results under the foreign-natural test.
The first case to actually stray from the foreign-natural distinction
was Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co. 159 In Bonenberger, the
of chicken in which this particular bone was found was dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it... [a] jury question
was presented.").
155. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 634, 822 P.2d at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
156. Id. at 638, 822 P.2d at 1306-07, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159-60 (Mosk, J., dissenting). This
is especially true in light of the difficulties in determining what is foreign and what is natural to
food, discussed supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
157. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 635, 822 P.2d at 1304, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). The Mexicali Rose majority opinion tries to eliminate these sorts of items from
the list of natural objects by limiting its holding to objects "natural to the preparation" of the
food. As discussed above, however, this qualifier clarifies nothing; defense attorneys will still
argue that objects such as these are "natural" to the food served. See supra notes 104-15 and
accompanying text.
158. See DICKERSON, supra note 80, § 4.3, at 185.
159. 28 A.2d 913 (Pa. 1942).
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned a directed verdict for the de-
fendant and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of
whether a piece of shell in canned oysters made them unmerchantable. 1°
The court did not actually base its decision on the reasonable expectation
test or even discuss it.161 Instead, it spent most of its analysis discussing
the implied warranty of merchantability.162 In any event, the court re-
fused to apply the foreign-natural test, as the court would have denied
the plaintiff recovery had it followed that test.
The first case to explicitly adopt the reasonable expectation test in
lieu of the foreign-natural test was Wood v. Waldorf System, Inc. 163 In
Wood, the plaintiff was eating chicken soup when a bone became lodged
in his throat.' 6 The court stated that its decision was properly based on
whether one could ordinarily expect to find the bone in chicken soup, not
on whether the bone was foreign or natural.165 From these beginnings
the reasonable expectation test has gained popularity and is currently the
majority rule.
166
One of the advantages of the reasonable expectation test is that it
focuses not on whether the injury-causing object was foreign or natural,
but rather on whether the reasonable consumer would have expected to
encounter the object in the food.' 67 As a result, the reasonable expecta-
tion test is much more flexible than the other two tests because the out-
come of the case is not necessarily decided once the origin of the injury-
causing object is ascertained.
This is not to say, of course, that the distinction between foreign and
natural objects is irrelevant. On the contrary, the origin of the injury-
causing object plays an important role in determining whether the plain-
tiff should have expected to find it in his or her food. Yet, as is illustrated
by the "sand in the spinach" example above, it should not be the sole
determinant. 68 There are many situations in which the origin of the
offensive object is no more decisive than any other factor in determining
the plaintiff's reasonable expectations. For example, if sand were found
in spinach, it would be important to know whether the spinach was
served raw, as in a salad, or cooked, perhaps by boiling. It would be of
160. Id. at 915.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 913-14.
163. 83 A.2d 90 (R.I. 1951).
164. Id. at 92.
165. Id. at 93.
166. See Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
167. See DICKERSON, supra note 80, § 4.3, at 185.
168. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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equal importance to know the type of restaurant involved, the reputation
of the restaurant, and various other facts. Thus, both the nature of the
object and how the food was prepared should merely be factors in consid-
ering the broader question of whether the plaintiff should have expected
to find sand in his or her spinach.169 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court
commented in Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp. ,170
Categorizing a substance as foreign or natural may have some
importance in determining the degree of negligence of the
processor of food, but it is not determinative of what is unfit or
harmful in fact for human consumption. A bone natural to the
meat can cause as much harm as a foreign substance such as a
pebble, piece of wire, or glass. All are indigestible and likely to
cause injury. Naturalness of the substance to any ingredients in
the food served is important only in determining whether the
consumer may reasonably expect to find such substance in the
particular type of dish or style of food served.17
Perhaps the reason the California Supreme Court failed to consider
the issue from this perspective is that when an object is foreign, the food
is almost certainly defective and unmerchantable, and the Mexicali Rose
court was correct in so holding.172 It does not follow from this analysis,
however, that if the object is not foreign, then the food is not defective
and unmerchantable. This is the problem inherent in the foreign-natural
and hybrid tests: They fail to recognize that a natural object can also
render food defective or unmerchantable, and therefore they also fail to
permit an injured consumer to recover based on strict or implied war-
ranty liability. This problem is remedied, however, when the foreign-
natural question becomes one of many factors in the overall analysis-as
it does in the reasonable expectation test.
A second advantage the reasonable expectation test offers is that it
focuses on the final product served to the customer. As discussed above,
a flaw in the foreign-natural and hybrid tests is that in basing the plain-
169. See Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Wis. 1960).
170. 103 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. 1960).
171. Id. at 67. See also Hochberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C.
1971) ("Because a substance is natural to a product in one stage of preparation does not mean
necessarily that it will be reasonably anticipated by the consumer in the final product
served."); O'Dell v. DeJean's Packing Co., 585 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (The
foreign-natural test "assumes all substances which are natural to the food are anticipated ....
Naturalness of substance can only be important in determining whether a consumer would
anticipate or expect to find the substance in the food.").
172. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303-04, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
There are limited exceptions, such as preservative packets in certain foods or cotton swabs in
vitamin jars.
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tiff's recovery on whether the injury causing object was foreign or natu-
ral, those tests focus on the food as it arrived at the restaurant, rather
than on its condition when it is served to the plaintiff. 173 Focusing on the
final product, however, considers the expectations of the consumer when
he or she sits down to eat the meal.1 74 As the Oklahoma Court of Ap-
peals noted in O'Dell v. DeJeans Packing Co. ,17 it is patently ridiculous
to compare a piece of whole fish, which will obviously contain bones,
with breaded fish sticks, which have been through several stages of
processing.1 76 The foreign-natural and hybrid tests, however, will treat
them the same, since in both types of fish the bones are natural objects.
Conversely, the reasonable expectation test will adjust to each of these
situations, recognizing that it is less reasonable to find bones in the
processed fish.17 7 Thus, the reasonable expectation test leads to the fairer
result.
The final and perhaps most important reason to favor the reasonable
expectation test is that, of the three tests, it is best suited to balancing the
competing public policy concerns presented by restaurant liability cases.
Because it evaluates each case on its individual facts, the test only holds
liable those defendants who have failed to meet consumers' reasonable
expectations, and thus compensates only those plaintiffs whose reason-
able expectations have not been met.
The foreign-natural and hybrid tests, however, ignore these policy
concerns. Neither of those tests, for example, encourages defendant res-
taurateurs to exercise greater care in making their food. By holding the
restaurateurs liable only when the plaintiff was injured by a foreign ob-
ject, the courts send a mixed message: A restaurant must, at all costs,
avoid serving food which contains foreign objects, but on the other hand
its food may contain all forms of natural objects, and still meet the legal
173. See supra parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
174. See Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
("[T]he only way of avoiding misapplication . . . is to focus on what the consumer might
reasonably expect to find in the final product."); Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgom-
ery, Inc., 431 So. 2d 975, 978 (Ala. 1983) ("The undesirability of the foreign substance test lies
in the artificial application at the initial stage of processing the food without consideration of
the expectations of the consumer in the final product served."); Hochberg, 272 A.2d at 848-49
(commenting that under modem restaurant procedures, "a substance.., natural to a product
in one stage of preparation does not mean necessarily that it will be reasonably anticipated by
the consumer in the final product served"); Zabner v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824,
828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (noting that the focus "must be [ ] on what the consumer might
reasonably expect to find in the food as served and not on what might be natural to the ingredi-
ents ... prior to preparation").
175. 585 P.2d 399 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
176. Id. at 402.
177. Id.
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standard for fitness for consumption. 17 8 Such an ambiguous message
does nothing to encourage restaurants to eliminate risks. It would be
much easier and more effective to tell the restaurants that they must al-
ways meet the expectations of the consumer: that the restaurant is serv-
ing reasonably risk-free food products.
The tort system is also concerned with compensating plaintiffs for
their injuries. 179 The foreign-natural and hybrid tests, however, quash
this goal by denying compensation to persons unless they are injured by
foreign objects. As a result, these tests ignore the simple fact that a
plaintiff can easily suffer a similar or even worse injury from a natural
object than from a foreign one.1 80 This is not to say that all injured
plaintiffs should always recover, but rather that the line between those
who recover and those who do not should not be drawn at the foreign-
natural distinction. The reasonable expectation test easily remedies this
situation, as its entire point is to award recoveries only to those plaintiffs
injured by unexpected objects."8
B. Plaintiffs Injured by Unexpected Natural Objects Should Be Able to
Recover Under Strict Liability and Implied Warranty
Theories
The problems with the Mexicali Rose approach do not end when a
court determines whether the object is foreign or natural. Once that is-
sue is decided, the court must determine under which theory(ies) of re-
covery-strict liability, implied warranty, or negligence-the plaintiff
can recover. The Mexicali Rose court allowed the nature of the injury-
causing object to determine the plaintiff's theory of recovery. If, instead,
all distinctions between foreign and natural injury-causing objects were
eliminated, all plaintiffs whose reasonable expectations have been vio-
178. See Charles R. Janes, Products Liabilit--The Test of Consumer Expectation for "Nat-
ural" Defects in Food Products, 37 OHlo ST. L.J. 634, 649 (1976).
179. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § I, at 6.
180. See, eg., Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So. 2d 975, 978
(Ala. 1983) ("It is entirely possible that a natural substance found in processed food may be
more indigestible and cause more injury than many 'foreign' substances."); Zabner v. Howard
Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) ("A nutshell natural to nut
meat can cause as much harm as a foreign substance, such as a pebble, piece of wire or glass.");
O'Dell, 585 P.2d at 402 ("Oftentimes, extensive damage and even death is caused by a sub-
stance in the prepared food that is 'natural' to the food item in its original state. Thus, there
seems little logic in the 'foreign-natural' test.").
181. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 643, 822 P.2d at 1310, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) ("It is theoretically possible to determine that a flaw in food does not render the
food unfit as a matter of law, but this is so not because the offending object is natural to the
dish, but because any reasonable consumer would anticipate the problem.").
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lated could simply recover under any of the three theories of products
liability: strict liability, implied warranty, or negligence.
18 2
In effect, the Mexicali Rose rule will allow a plaintiff only mildly
injured by a piece of glass to recover, while denying recovery to a plaintiff
severely injured by a bone. 183 Basing a plaintiff's theory of recovery on
the type of object which injured him or her, as this rule does, defies many
public policy concerns. 184 Moreover, the case law in this area reveals
that food servers have historically been held to very high standards.'85
Finally, an analysis of the elements of the implied warranty and strict
liability theories in California shows that an injury incurred from objects
in food creates a cause of action under both theories, regardless of the
nature of the injury-causing object.
186
1. Public policy reasons supporting use of strict liability and implied
warranty theories for natural-object injuries
At common law, sellers of food were always held to higher stan-
dards than sellers of other products, primarily because food is ingested
and can very directly affect one's health.187 In light of this fact, the Mex-
icali Rose decision seems an especially odd one. California has histori-
cally been a leader in the products liability area, especially in the area of
strict products liability.1 88 It has traditionally sought to compensate the
injured plaintiff by holding the defendant who sells or manufactures a
182. Although this Note treats them separately, the "theory of recovery" debate and the
"foreign-natural/hybrid/reasonable expectation" debate are not completely separate issues; in-
deed, they are interwoven. Which theories of recovery are available to a plaintiff is a direct
result of whether the foreign-natural, hybrid, or reasonable expectation test is applied. The
focus of this Note, of course, is to eliminate this interplay between the two issues by allowing
all plaintiffs whose reasonable expectations have been violated to recover under any of the
three theories.
183. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156, where
the court states its holding:
If the injury-producing substance is natural to the preparation of the food
served, it can be said that it was reasonably expected by its very nature.... A plain-
tiff in such a case has no cause of action in strict liability or implied warranty. If,
however, the presence of the natural substance is due to a restaurateur's failure to
exercise due care in food preparation, the injured patron may sue under a negligence
theory.
If the injury causing substance is foreign to the food served, then the injured
patron may also state a cause of action in implied warranty and strict liability ....
Id.
184. See infra part III.B.1.
185. Prosser, supra note 44, at 1103.
186. See infra part III.B.2.
187. Prosser, supra note 44, at 1103.
188. See supra part II.B.2.
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product to a very stringent standard. 1 9 Indeed, California was the first
state to impose a tort theory of strict liability on a defendant.19 This
tendency of the California courts, coupled with the traditional belief that
sellers of food should be held to higher standards, would lead one to
believe that a seller of food in California would undoubtedly be held to
the highest possible standard. Oddly, however, the California Supreme
Court did not follow this logic in Mexicali Rose, concluding instead that
in certain instances-those involving natural objects-the defendant
need only exercise due care.
Even more surprising is the fact that the court's decision makes very
little reference to convincing authority. On the contrary, the majority
opinion is dotted with only paltry citation to supportive case law and
often incorrect readings of the relevant statutes and rules. 191 Moreover,
the opinion does not consider any of the policies underlying tort or con-
tract law. Justice Mosk, commenting on the majority's analysis in his
dissenting opinion, stated that the "analysis must be more refined...
because [the] task is to determine not so much the outcome of this law-
suit as the standard to be applied." '192 An analysis of the policies behind
warranty and strict liability, however, explains why the majority may
have been reluctant to discuss them: These policies support a conclusion
189. See generally Prosser, supra note 44, which, in tracing the emergence of strict liability,
refers often to opinions of California courts, and quotes extensively from Justice Traynor's
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). For
further discussion of Justice Traynor's concurrence, see infra notes 200-03 and accompanying
text.
190. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 98, at 694 (referring to California case of Green-
man v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)). The
high standards imposed on defendant manufacturers and sellers in California is also evidenced
by the fact that the California courts found Restatement § 402A to be too restrictive and thus
eliminated its requirement that the product be "unreasonably dangerous." See supra note 69
and accompanying text.
191. See, for example, Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 632, 822 P.2d at 1302, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
155, where the court comments that "the Restatement Second of Torts, Section 402A, com-
ment h, emphasizes that the doctrine of strict liability applies in the limited situation arising
when foreign objects or ingredients not characteristic of food cause harm." Id. This is incor-
rect. Comment h actually reads: "The defective condition may arise not only from harmful
ingredients, not characteristic of the product itself either as to presence or quantity, but also
from foreign objects contained in the product, from decay or deterioration before sale, or from
the way in which the product is prepared or packed." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. h (1984) (emphasis added). The plain language of comment h thus indicates that
while strict liability is certainly applicable to foreign objects in products, it is by no means
limited to them. Natural injury-causing objects in food certainly could fall within the domain
of decay, deterioration, or product preparation. The applicability of section 402A to natural-
object injuries is discussed further infra part III.B.2.
192. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 640, 822 P.2d at 1308, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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contrary to that of the Mexicali Rose court, that strict liability and im-
plied warranty should be imposed on sellers of food without any differen-
tiation between foreign or natural objects.
First, virtually all product defects are judged under a strict stan-
dard. California has been a leader in enforcing high standards on manu-
facturers and sellers. 193 The Mexicali Rose rule, however, creates a
subcategory of products liability law for restaurateurs; cases involving
food are treated differently from those involving other injury-causing
products. There is no reason for this discrepancy. Food sold by a restau-
rant is no different from any other product sold by a retailer, and can
even pose greater risks to the consumer because it is ingested.' 94 The
Mexicali Rose court obviously agreed with this reasoning, as it held that
restaurateurs are strictly liable in tort and warranty when they serve food
which contains an injury-causing foreign object. 9 Why, however, did
the court not extend this strict standard to situations involving natural
objects as well?
The court did not offer an answer to this question. The only reason
the court mentioned for the differentiation between foreign and natural
objects was that a "plaintiff cannot state a cause of action based on the
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability or strict products lia-
bility, because it is a matter of common knowledge that the natural sub-
stance is occasionally found in the food served."' 96 This is quite an
assumption. Even assuming the plaintiff in Mexicali Rose could be
charged with the "common knowledge" that his enchilada could have
contained chicken bones, it is quite a leap in reasoning to assume that all
people, when ordering food, also possess the "common knowledge" that
it may contain other supposedly natural objects such as feathers, salmo-
nella, or mold. While there are certainly many situations in which one
could be charged with common knowledge, such as expecting that a
cherry will contain a pit, it does not automatically follow that a particu-
lar object should always be expected simply because it is natural.
The fact that the court offered no justification for differentiating for-
eign and natural objects may be an indication that there is no justifica-
tion. One possible argument, and probably the argument on which the
court implicitly relied, is that of common sense. That is, when a natural
object such as a bone is present in the food, in all likelihood the preparer
193. See supra part II.B.2.
194. See generally Prosser, supra note 44, at 1103-06 (discussing special treatment of food
cases by courts, even as early as 15th century).
195. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303-04, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
196. Id. at 626, 822 P.2d at 1298, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
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never noticed it or simply neglected to remove it; if a foreign object such
as glass is in the food, however, this indicates some higher culpability.
At least one extra step must have been taken by the defendant for the
foreign object to have gotten into the food. Although this argument may
sound convincing, for purposes of products liability it has no merit. It
focuses entirely on the manufacturer's or seller's conduct, rather than on
the condition of the product itself, the more appropriate focus in a prod-
ucts liability action.
197
The second policy reason to adopt strict liability in the food context
is that the restaurateur is in a much better position to achieve the objec-
tives underlying tort law. Two of the principal aims of tort law are (1) to
reduce the hazards which are present in society, and (2) to do so as effi-
ciently as possible. 98 Between the injured plaintiff and the defendant
seller, the latter is obviously in a much better position to achieve these
goals. Holding the defendant liable places liability on the party that
could more readily have avoided the injury, and that is in the better posi-
tion to spread the costs of the injury through pricing. 199
These arguments are especially applicable in the context of food
products served in restaurants. When consumers go into such establish-
ments, there is limited opportunity for them to inspect the food they are
served.2" Although they might be able to pick through the food once it
arrives at their table, this is neither a realistic expectation nor should it
be the consumer's duty.20' The restaurateur, however, generally receives
the food in an unprocessed condition and can therefore inspect it and
eliminate harmful objects through proper management and preparation.
It is, therefore, the restaurateur-not the consumer-who is in the best
position to maintain the quality of the food and prevent injuries from
occurring.20 2 When restaurateurs fail to do this, whether negligent or
197. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 447, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 229 (1978) ("[This test reflects our continued adherence to the principle that, in a prod-
uct liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the product, not on the manufacturer's
conduct, and that the plaintiff need not prove that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or
negligently in order to prevail . . ").
198. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 3, at 16.
199. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
200. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
201. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
202. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor commented:
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the
recurrence of others, as the public cannot....
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not, well-established tort goals dictate that they be held liable.2 °3 As the
Supreme Court of Texas has pointed out,
[i]t is usually impracticable, if not impossible, for the ultimate
consumer to analyze the food and ascertain whether or not it is
suitable for human consumption. Since it has been placed on
the market as a food for human consumption, and marked as
such, the purchaser usually eats it or causes it to be served to
his family without the precaution of having it analyzed by a
technician to ascertain whether or not it is suitable for human
consumption. In fact, in most instances the only satisfactory
examination that could be made would be only at the time and
place of the processing of the food. It seems to be the rule that
where food products sold for human consumption are unfit for
that purpose... the law imposes a warranty of purity in favor
of the ultimate consumer as a matter of public policy. 2"
Critics of this theory have argued that it will subject restaurateurs to
crushing liability and that society cannot force restaurateurs to become
absolute insurers of the products they serve. 20° Restaurateurs, however,
would not be subject to strict liability for every object in the food they
serve. The application of the reasonable expectation test would eliminate
any risk of crushing liability to restaurateurs because it would impose
strict liability on them only when the injury resulted from an object
which the consumer could not have reasonably expected. Indeed, many
courts which apply the reasonable expectation test have denied plaintiffs
recovery under strict liability and implied warranty theories.20 6
Furthermore, restaurateurs would not be subject to crushing liabil-
ity because they may sue their suppliers for indemnity or increase their
... The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself
the soundness of a product.... Consumers no longer approach products warily but
accept them on faith ....
Id. at 462, 467, 150 P.2d at 440-41, 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
203. Id.
204. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. 1942), overruled on other
grounds by McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
205. See, e.g., Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), overruled by
Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, I Cal. 4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154 (1992).
206. See, eg., Carl v. Dixie Co., 467 So. 2d 960, 960 (Ala. 1985) (disallowing plaintiff's
recovery under implied warranty theory because jury found plaintiff should have reasonably
expected bone in piece of chicken); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309, 312
(Mass. 1964) (disallowing plaintiff's recovery under implied warranty theory because jury
found plaintiff should have reasonably expected shells in fish chowder); Allen v. Grafton, 164
N.E.2d 167, 174 (Ohio 1960) (disallowing plaintiff's recovery under implied warranty theory
because jury found plaintiff should have reasonably expected to find oyster shell in oysters).
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prices, thereby distributing the cost among the public as a cost of doing
business.2"7 The plaintiff is not in a position to pass along the costs of his
or her injury, nor should he or she be required to when the defendant's
action has occasioned the injury. 208 This does not mean that strict liabil-
ity or implied warranty liability would not burden the restaurateur. On
the contrary, they might often be substantial burdens. They are burdens,
however, which must be borne by one side or the other, and in that con-
text the defendant is the only fair and reasonable choice.20 9 Having the
restaurant assume liability and spread the loss, therefore, satisfies both
goals of the tort system: It encourages the restaurateur to meet consum-
ers' reasonable expectations, and also makes the system function more
efficiently.
Finally, the adoption of strict liability in warranty and tort for plain-
tiffs injured by natural objects is important to further the policy of com-
pensating an injured plaintiff. Under a negligence standard, the plaintiffs
in these cases are unlikely to receive compensation. 210  Thus, the Mexi-
cali Rose rule hinders this policy goal.
The primary reason that plaintiffs injured by natural objects will not
recover damages is that negligence is generally too difficult to prove in
restaurant cases. The difficulty stems from the first two prongs of the
test: proving the defendant had a duty and that he or she breached that
duty.2 1  In general tort law, the first prong poses an especially difficult
problem to plaintiffs who are suing retailers rather than manufacturers of
207. See Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
208. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
209. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 636, 822 P.2d at 1305, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). Some might argue that this rationale treats defendants as scapegoats in situa-
tions where they may not be morally blameworthy. Simply because neither side is blamewor-
thy, however, does not eliminate the fact that one party has been injured by the other party's
actions, whether they were innocent, negligent, reckless or intentional. As Justice Mosk com-
mented in his dissenting opinion in Mexicali Rose, quoting a previous decision of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court:
"The application of the rule of implied warranty to cases such as that before us may
impose a heavy burden upon the keepers of restaurants and lunch counters, but con-
siderations of public policy and public health and safety are of such importance as to
demand that such an obligation be imposed. As between the patron, who has no
means of determining whether the food served is safe for human consumption, and
the seller, who has the opportunity of determining its fitness, the burden properly
rests with the seller, who could have so cared for the food as to have made the injury
to the customer impossible."
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. 2d 683, 687, 59 P.2d 142,
143-44 (1936)).
210. See Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 645 n.l, 822 P.2d at 1311 n.1, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164
n.1 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
211. As discussed supra part II.B. 1, these two prongs constitute the main difference be-
tween negligence and the other two theories of products liability. The last two prongs of the
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products, as most courts hold that retailers have no duty to inspect the
products they sell.212 Manufacturers, on the other hand, are required to
manufacture safe products.21 3 Thus, the plaintiff who sues a retailer will
virtually never survive the first prong. 14 In the restaurant context, the
issue becomes whether restaurants are to be considered "retailers" or
"manufacturers" of food. On the one hand, restaurants frequently sell
food products purchased from other "manufacturers," so they could be
viewed as retailers. Conversely, and perhaps more accurately, they do
not sell these products without first handling them, and thus they are
more analogous to manufacturers. The Mexicali Rose court adopted the
latter view, ruling that restaurants do owe consumers a duty of care be-
cause the food served is directly under their custody and control.21
Although a plaintiff injured by a natural object thus may be able to
satisfy the first prong of the negligence test, he or she will almost never
satisfy the second prong. The plaintiff in a products liability action has
very few tools available to prove that the defendant failed to meet the
duty of reasonable care. For example, in light of the Mix line of cases, it
is doubtful that a restaurateur who serves food containing natural injury-
causing substances has violated any sort of custom. 21 6 Moreover, it is
doubtful that a plaintiff in California could rely on any statutory viola-
tion to establish that the restaurateur was negligent.217 Although the
negligence test, causation and damages, must also be proven in both strict liability and implied
warranty.
212. See Prosser, supra note 44, at 1116-17.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1117 ("It is here that negligence liability breaks down. The wholesaler, the
jobber, and the retailer normally are simply not negligent. They are under no duty to test or
inspect the chattel, and they do not do so. .. ").
215. Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 632, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
216. Courts occasionally consult custom, or the manner in which activities are normally
carried out in a trade or community, in determining the defendant's duty of care and whether
this duty was met. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 17.3, at 578-92. Mix and its progeny,
however, indicate that the courts probably would not find any sort of customary duty for
restaurateurs to inspect the food they serve for natural objects. Moreover, even if the courts
did find such a duty, and then that the particular defendant had breached that duty, custom is
not considered conclusive on the issue of the defendant's reasonable care; rather, it is merely
one factor in the calculus. Id.
217. In addition to custom, courts in negligence suits also consult statutes in evaluating
whether the defendant has met his or her duty. See id. § 17.6, at 613-48. Ordinarily, a statu-
tory violation is advantageous to the plaintiff, as courts in most states, including California,
hold that such a violation establishes that the defendant was negligent per se. Id. at 619.
In California, there are several federal and state statutes and regulations which address
the issue of substances in food. For example, 9 C.F.R. § 319.5 (1990) prohibits bones larger
than .85 millimeters in any processed foods. In addition, section 26520 of the California
Health and Safety Code states that food containing any poisonous or deleterious material "is
not considered adulterated if the substance is a naturally occurring substance and if the quan-
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court in Mexicali Rose noted that most plaintiffs asserting negligence in
food cases do so under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,21 8 even that more
liberal doctrine will be of little help to plaintiffs. 219 In short, in most
jurisdictions plaintiffs will have difficulty asserting a negligence cause of
action.
Under the Mexicali Rose rule, the situation is even worse for plain-
tiffs in California who are injured by natural objects, for they will have to
clear one additional hurdle. They will be required to prove their negli-
gence claim against a presumption that the natural object did not render
the food unfit or defective.220 The court stated this "negligence plus"
standard as follows:
If the injury-producing substance is natural to the preparation
of the food served, it can be said that it was reasonably ex-
pected by its very nature and the food cannot be determined
unfit or defective. A plaintiff in such a case has no cause of
action in strict liability or implied warranty. If, however, the
presence of the natural substance is due to a restaurateur's fail-
ure to exercise due care in food preparation, the injured patron
may sue under a negligence theory.22'
This presumption further restricts the plaintiff's ability to recover. In
effect, trial courts will be required to instruct juries that the plaintiff must
tity of such substance in the food does not render it injurious to health." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 26520 (West 1992). Thus, a plaintiff injured by a natural substance, already
limited to a negligence cause of action, would be further limited because the very language of
this statute precludes the plaintiff from using it to establish that the defendant was negligent
per se.
218. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633 n.9, 822 P.2d at 1303 n.9, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156
n.9 (Mosk, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of res ipsa loquitur, see Prosser, supra note
44, at 1117. Generally, res ipsa loquitur allows the plaintiff to infer the defendant's negligence
from circumstantial evidence, when the instrumentality producing the injury was in the exclu-
sive control of the defendant. Id.
219. Prosser, supra note 44, at 1117. In this article, Dean Prosser states that despite this
more liberal standard, "no inference of negligence can arise against [the wholesaler and re-
tailer] and res ipsa loquitur is of no use at all." Id.
California Supreme Court Justice Traynor, in his famous concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), pointed out another problem
which confronts plaintiffs trying to assert res ipsa loquitur in a products liability action. He
noted that although res ipsa loquitur may appear to work to the plaintiff's advantage because
it allows the court or jury to infer the defendant's negligence:
[T]he inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper
care.... An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such
evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the
manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is.
Id. at 462-63, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
220. See Mexicali Rose, 1 Cal. 4th at 633, 822 P.2d at 1303, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
221. Id.
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prove the defendant was negligent in preparing food that is nondefective.
It is doubtful that jurors will be able to reconcile the contradiction in this
statement and thus, the plaintiff's already difficult recovery becomes her-
culean. Consequently, plaintiffs will find it nearly impossible to win cases
under the Mexicali Rose "negligence plus" standard.
Thus, the Mexicali Rose court has apparently forgotten what it rec-
ognized fourteen years ago in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. :222 "One of
the principal purposes behind the strict products liability doctrine is to
relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous burdens inherent in a
negligence cause of action. ' 223 This statement is so irreconcilable with
the holding of Mexicali Rose that one cannot help but wonder how the
same court decided both cases. In denying patrons injured by a natural
object in food the ability to assert strict liability and implied warranty
actions, the California Supreme Court has plainly subjected them to "the
onerous burden[ ]" of proving negligence, a burden nearly impossible to
shoulder.
2. Injuries from natural objects in food fall well within the California
rules for strict liability and implied warranty
Aside from public policy reasons, the most compelling argument for
allowing plaintiffs injured by natural objects to recover under strict liabil-
ity and implied warranty is that California law in these areas plainly cov-
ers such natural-object injuries. Neither theory is limited only to
plaintiffs injured by foreign objects in food, yet the Mexicali Rose major-
ity somehow read this limitation into both of them. 24 When the
Mexicali Rose court denied plaintiffs injured by natural objects the op-
portunity to recover under these theories, it blatantly contradicted Cali-
fornia's statutory and common law.
To the extent that the Mexicali Rose court allowed plaintiffs injured
by foreign objects in restaurant food to pursue claims under strict liabil-
ity and implied warranty, it impliedly conceded that the elements of each
of these theories are satisfied when a plaintiff is injured by a foreign ob-
ject.225 Under strict liability, for example, the Mexicali Rose holding im-
plies that a restaurateur is considered a seller engaged "in the business of
selling products" 226 designed to "reach the user or consumer without
222. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
223. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
224. Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 632, 822 P.2d at 1302, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
225. Id. at 633, 822 P.2d at 1302, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155.
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1984).
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substantial change." '227 It also implies that the plaintiffs injured in res-
taurants meet the Restatement's "physical harm"22 requirement. Simi-
larly, under an implied warranty theory, the Mexicali Rose holding
implies that food sold in a restaurant is considered a "sale of goods,
'229
rather than a service, thus invoking the warranty. It also implies that the
restaurateur is considered a "merchant"23 0 as defined in the California
Commercial Code. Thus, it is apparent from the language of Restate-
ment section 402A and the California Commercial Code as well as from
the holding of Mexicali Rose itself, that at least some food cases-those
involving foreign objects-satisfy the elements of both strict liability and
implied warranty.
The Mexicali Rose court, however, was far more restrictive regard-
ing injury-causing objects that are not foreign to the food. Cases involv-
ing natural objects are no different than foreign object cases, however,
and thus should not be treated differently. The above-mentioned ele-
ments of both the strict liability and implied warranty theories are still
met in natural object cases; in fact, it is ludicrous to assert that they are
not.2 1 There is, however, one element of both theories which remains a
point of controversy in the natural object cases: What constitutes a "de-
fective" product under section 402A, or an "unmerchantable" product
under the implied warranty? In the food context, this one element of
both the strict liability and implied warranty tests becomes the central
issue to be resolved.23 2 The issue is the same in both tests, despite the
different language each uses.233 In determining both a product's defec-
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See CAL. COM. CODE § 2314 (West 1992).
230. See id. See also supra note 78 for the definition of "merchant."
231. Under strict liability, for example, the restaurateur is still a seller "in the business of
selling products" designed to "reach the user or consumer without substantial change." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. Moreover, plaintiffs injured by natural objects still
meet the physical harm requirement. Similarly, under implied warranty, food sold by the
restaurateur in natural object cases is still considered a "sale of goods," rather than a service.
CAL. COM. CODE § 2314. Moreover, the restaurateur still falls within the code's definition of
"merchant." See supra note 78.
232. See Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 432-33, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369,
373 (1969).
233. See id. (commenting that "[t]he fact that no instruction was given by the trial court on
the law of strict liability in tort does not preclude reliance on that theory since the basic ele-
ments to be proved are the same"). See also Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th
Cir. 1968) (commenting that "[w]e find no error in ... present[ing] this case to the jury on
warranty rather than on strict liability in tort. The law as emerging is tending toward the
latter treatment but under either approach the elements remain the same. The difference is
largely one of terminology."); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind.
1965) (commenting that strict liability under section 402A is "hardly more than what exists
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tiveness and its lack of merchantability, the underlying question is the
same: Was the food of such inferior quality as to trigger the imposition
of a strict standard of care? It is this question which the foreign-natural,
hybrid, and reasonable expectation tests are designed to answer, and the
reasonable expectation test provides the best answers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Mexicali Rose v. Supe-
rior Court2 34 was probably intended to strike a compromise.235  The
court did not want to perpetuate the strict rule of Mix v. Ingersoll Candy
Co. ,236 which made a plaintiff's recovery so difficult, but it also did not
want to subject the restaurateur to potentially "crushing liability. ' 237 In-
deed, in fashioning any rule for the apportionment of tort liability,
achieving this balance is always the principal goal; society wants to com-
pensate those plaintiffs who have been wronged, but at the expense of
only those defendants who caused the wrong.238 Unfortunately, in fash-
ioning its rule, the Mexicali Rose court failed to strike this balance. In its
rejection of the reasonable expectation test, it tipped the scales in favor of
defendant restaurateurs and offered plaintiffs injured by natural objects
little more than they had under the original foreign-natural test.
The court could have better achieved the balance it sought by adopt-
ing the reasonable expectation test as the standard to assess defendant
restaurateurs' liability.239 This standard allows for a case-by-case assess-
ment of liability, holding defendants liable only if they serve food that
contains an object that a reasonable person would not have antici-
pated.2' This rule secures the defendants' side of the balance, ensuring
that they will not be held liable unless they violate the customer's reason-
able expectations?.24  And it also protects plaintiffs-once they prove
that the food did not comport with their reasonable expectations, they
may recover under any of the three theories of products liability and not
under implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, require-
ments of notice of defect, and limitation.").
234. 1 Cal. 4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
235. See id. at 631-32, 822 P.2d at 1302-03, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-56.
236. 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
4th 617, 822 P.2d 1292, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (1992).
237. See Mexicali Rose, I Cal. 4th at 630-33, 822 P.2d at 1301-03, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-56.
238. KEETON ET AL., supra note 42, § 1, at 6 (commenting that "[t]he purpose of the law of
torts is to adjust ... losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as
the result of the conduct of another.").
239. See supra part III.A.1.
240. See supra part III.A.3.
241. See supra part III.A.3.
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merely under negligence.24 2 Under the Mexicali Rose rule, a plaintiff in-
jured by a natural object can only recover under a "negligence plus" the-
ory-a nearly impossible task.243 Further, public policy, statutes and
case law all indicate that plaintiffs injured by natural objects (in addition
to those injured by foreign objects) should be allowed to recover under
strict liability and implied warranty theories. 2" This would secure the
plaintiffs' side of the balance, ensuring that if they prove their expecta-
tions were not met, they will recover.24 Thus, the court's attempt to
balance the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants in restaurant
liability cases was legitimate. The rule it adopted to achieve that balance,
however, was faulty.
Richard H. Otera*
242. See supra part III.A.3.
243. See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
244. See supra part III.B.2.
245. See supra part III.B.2.
* As a small token of my appreciation, this Note is dedicated to my father, Paul Otera,
and my fiane6e, Akemi Yamane, for their continuing support and love. I would also like to
thank Professor John Nockleby of Loyola of Los Angeles Law School for his insightful
comments.
November 1993]
434 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:397
